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NOTES 
GUILT BY GENETIC ASSOCIATION: 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE SEARCH OF PRIVATE GENETIC 
DATABASES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Claire Abrahamson* 
 
Over the course of 2018, a number of suspects in unsolved crimes have 
been identified through the use of GEDMatch, a public online genetic 
database.  Law enforcement’s use of GEDMatch to identify suspects in cold 
cases likely does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment 
because the genetic information hosted on the website is publicly available.  
Transparency reports from direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing 
providers like 23andMe and Ancestry suggest that federal and state officials 
may now be requesting access to private genetic databases as well.  Whether 
law enforcement’s use of private DTC genetic databases to search for 
familial relatives of a suspect’s genetic profile constitutes a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is far less clear. 
A strict application of the third-party doctrine suggests that individuals 
have no expectation of privacy in genetic information that they voluntarily 
disclose to third parties, including DTC providers.  This Note, however, 
contends that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. 
United States overwhelmingly supports the proposition that genetic 
information disclosed to third-party DTC providers is subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Approximately fifteen million individuals in the 
United States have already submitted their genetic information to DTC 
providers.  The genetic information held by these providers can reveal a host 
of highly intimate details about consumers’ medical conditions, behavioral 
traits, genetic health risks, ethnic background, and familial relationships.  
Allowing law enforcement warrantless access to investigate third-party DTC 
genetic databases circumvents their consumers’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy by exposing this sensitive genetic information to law enforcement 
without any meaningful oversight.  Furthermore, individuals likely 
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reasonably expect that they retain ownership over their uniquely personal 
genetic information despite their disclosure of that information to a third-
party provider.  This Note therefore asserts that the third-party doctrine does 
not permit law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches for suspects on 
private DTC genetics databases under the Fourth Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2019, Jerry Westrom, a fifty-two-year-old male, visited an ice 
rink to watch his daughter play in a hockey game.1  Westrom ordered a hot 
dog at the concession stand and wiped his mouth with a napkin.2  
Unbeknownst to Westrom, Minneapolis law enforcement officers 
investigating the violent 1993 murder of a thirty-five-year-old woman named 
Jeanne Anne “Jeanie” Childs were tracking his every move.3  A Minneapolis 
homicide detective investigating the crime had previously run DNA samples 
obtained from the crime scene through a public genealogy website.4  Either 
Westrom or one of his relatives had submitted their genealogical profile to 
 
 1. Paul Walsh, Charge:  Hockey Dad’s Discarded Napkin at Rink Ties Him to 1993 
Killing in Twin Cities 25 Years Later, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.startribune.com/man-charged-with-murder-in-stabbing-of-minneapolis-woman-
in-93/505838292 [https://perma.cc/EQ4M-S2UN]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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this public website, and the police honed in on Westrom as a likely suspect 
for Childs’s murder.5  As soon as the hockey game was over, the police 
retrieved Westrom’s discarded napkin from a trash can and sent it for forensic 
testing.6  The DNA obtained from Westrom’s napkin matched the DNA 
samples collected from the Childs crime scene.7  After over twenty-five years 
of unsuccessful investigations, Westrom was arrested and charged with 
Childs’s murder. 
Westrom represents one of over fifty suspects in unsolved cold cases who 
have been similarly identified through the use of public genealogy websites 
in the past year.8  This burgeoning police practice gained traction in the 
spring of 2018, when police arrested the “Golden State Killer,” a violent 
serial killer allegedly responsible for more than fifty rapes and twelve 
murders across the state of California between 1974 and 1986.9  Paul Holes, 
an enterprising DNA expert investigating the crimes, used DNA recovered 
from a 1980 crime scene of a double homicide suspected to have been 
committed by the Golden State Killer to develop a “genetic profile” of the 
suspect.10  Holes then uploaded this genetic profile to GEDMatch,11 a public 
genealogy website with a database of more than 650,000 voluntarily 
uploaded raw genetic profiles exported from private direct-to-consumer 
(DTC) genetic testing companies12 like 23andMe13 and Ancestry.14 
GEDMatch analyzed the DNA data points of the suspect’s profile and, 
within twenty-four hours, provided Holes with a list of ten to twenty distant 
relatives of the suspect.15  Using this information, Holes worked with 
Barbara Rae-Venter, a well-known family-tree builder, to develop family 
trees of thousands of potential suspect relatives.16  One of those family trees 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id.; see also Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting Is Family Tree 
Forensics, WIRED (Dec. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-
crime-fighting-is-family-tree-forensics [https://perma.cc/TV7L-S3QU]. 
 9. See Megan Molteni, The Creepy Genetics Behind the Golden State Killer Case, WIRED 
(Apr. 27, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/detectives-cracked-the-golden-state-
killer-case-using-genetics [https://perma.cc/BH7T-F3WX]. 
 10. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His 
Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-
great-great-grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/BYS4-47UM]. 
 11. GEDMATCH, https://www.gedmatch.com [https://perma.cc/A4LT-NPSQ] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 12. See Molteni, supra note 9.  This Note refers to these companies as “DTC providers.” 
 13. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com [https://perma.cc/3AFH-V4BU] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019). 
 14. ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com [https://perma.cc/2Y9A-K8KK] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019). 
 15. See id.; see also Jouvenal, supra note 10. 
 16. See Jouvenal, supra note 10; see also Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden 
State Killer Case.  Here’s What She’s Going to Do Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/barbara-rae-venter-gsk.html [https://perma.cc/ 
SH4U-DDFJ]. 
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included Joseph James DeAngelo, a retired police officer living in California 
whose age, sex, and place of residence fit the profile for the Golden State 
Killer.17  As with Westrom, the Sacramento police subsequently surveilled 
DeAngelo and collected his DNA from a discarded item.18  DeAngelo’s 
DNA matched DNA collected from the Golden State Killer’s crime scenes, 
and he was arrested.19 
Since the arrest of the Golden State Killer, the use of public genealogy 
websites to identify suspects has become a preeminent method of solving 
cold cases.20  Parabon Nanolabs, a Virginia-based forensic analysis 
company, recently began offering investigative genealogy services using 
GEDMatch, citing the increasing demand from law enforcement.21  The 
databases of public genealogy websites like GEDMatch are limited to those 
individuals who voluntarily upload their raw genetic data obtained from DTC 
providers to find relatives.22  Law enforcement’s use of public genealogy 
websites for identification of suspects likely is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment23 because these open-source databases of voluntarily disclosed 
raw genetic data are hosted on public websites and therefore are within the 
“plain view” of law enforcement.24 
This Note, however, examines whether law enforcement’s use of DTC 
providers’ private databases to search for relatives of a suspect genetic profile 
would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.  DTC providers 
typically require that an individual submits “three milliliters of saliva” to 
compare his or her genetic profile against others in their databases.25  As a 
result, law enforcement officers cannot use the same technique as is used 
with GEDMatch and likely would have to serve DTC providers with a 
subpoena or search warrant for their consumers’ genetic information.26 
The databases of DTC providers contain approximately fifteen million 
genetic profiles as opposed to the one million profiles on GEDMatch.27  
Because any one of these millions of profiles could provide a genetic familial 
match to a suspect in a cold case, it is highly likely that law enforcement will 
 
 17. See Molteni, supra note 9. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy 
Database, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/ 
gedmatch-police-genealogy-database/561695 [https://perma.cc/G5W9-XZBG]. 
 21. See Molteni, supra note 8. 
 22. See Zhang, supra note 20. 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 24. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).  Pursuant to Horton, where “an 
article is already in [the] plain view [of law enforcement], neither its observation nor its 
seizure . . . involve any invasion of privacy.” Id.  Therefore, law enforcement officers likely 
are entitled to search public websites for genetic information germane to their investigations 
without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 
 25. See Molteni, supra note 9. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through 
Genealogy Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/ 
science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html [https://perma.cc/AAV2-92W4]. 
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pursue investigation of such databases.28  Indeed, FamilyTreeDNA, a leading 
DTC provider, recently disclosed to the public that it has been cooperating 
with the FBI to test genetic profiles of suspects against its genetic databases 
since the fall of 2018.29 
The annual “transparency reports” of the two largest DTC providers, 
23andMe and Ancestry, state that law enforcement officials have made 
requests to these companies to investigate stored data about their users, 
although both assert that they have not provided any genetic information 
about users in response.30  The privacy policies of Ancestry and 23andMe 
each state that “valid legal process” is required for them to produce 
information to law enforcement about their users.31  In addition, 23andMe’s 
privacy policy explicitly states that it uses “all practical legal and 
administrative resources to resist [law enforcement] requests.”32  However, 
the extent to which these DTC providers can “resist” such requests under the 
Fourth Amendment remains unclear. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search that would violate an individual’s 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” generally requires a warrant.33  The 
U.S. Supreme Court, nevertheless, has articulated a standard informally 
known as the “third-party doctrine,” which asserts that a person “has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information . . . voluntarily turn[ed] over 
to third parties.”34  A strict application of the third-party doctrine might 
suggest that investigating genetic information held by DTC providers is not 
 
 28. See Elizabeth R. Pike, Securing Sequences:  Ensuring Adequate Protections for 
Genetic Samples in the Age of Big Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977, 2010 (2016). 
 29. See Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing Companies Is 
Working with the FBI, BUZZFEED (Jan. 31, 2019, 8:52 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/ 
article/salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbi-investigative-genealogy-privacy 
[http://perma.cc/W65Y-XD4Y]; see also Press Release, FamilyTreeDNA, Connecting 
Families and Saving Lives (Feb. 1, 2019), https://blog.familytreedna.com/press-release-
connecting-families-and-saving-lives [https://perma.cc/M5RV-8VK2]. 
 30. According to 23andMe’s transparency report, as of February 15, 2019, 23andMe has 
received five “user data requests” from law enforcement. Transparency Report, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report [https://perma.cc/RYB8-BN57] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019).  The report states that 23andMe did not produce “user data” in response to any 
of these requests. Id.  Between 2017 and 2018, Ancestry received forty-four information 
requests from law enforcement. Ancestry 2017 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency-2017 [https://perma.cc/GVJ7-33D8] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019); Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/ 
cs/transparency [https://perma.cc/ESR7-4QMM] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  Ancestry’s 
transparency reports state that it provided information in response to thirty-eight of those forty-
four requests over two years but that none of the information provided included genetic 
information of its consumers. Ancestry 2017 Transparency Report, supra; Ancestry 2018 
Transparency Report, supra. 
 31. See Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/ 
cs/legal/lawenforcement [https://perma.cc/YC7W-9GGC] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); 
Transparency Report, supra note 30. 
 32. See 23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/ 
law-enforcement-guide [https://perma.cc/VS8V-TWFU] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 34. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); see also United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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a Fourth Amendment search because this information has been willingly 
shared by consumers with a third party.35  Accordingly, these consumers 
arguably have no reasonable expectation of privacy in genetic information 
disclosed to DTC providers. 
However, this Note contends that a strict application of the third-party 
doctrine to genetic information held by third parties is inappropriate.  This 
stored genetic information can reveal medical traits, behavioral tendencies, 
ethnic backgrounds, and familial associations of millions of individual 
consumers.36  The Court has, in different contexts, held that information of 
this nature is private and constitutionally protected from government 
intrusion.37  Individuals therefore maintain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their genetic information despite disclosing it to a DTC provider 
for analysis. 
Part I evaluates DTC providers’ services and privacy policies by using two 
of the largest DTC providers, 23andMe and Ancestry, as exemplars.  Part I 
also compares the databases of DTC providers against the Combined DNA 
Index System (CODIS), the national DNA database typically used by law 
enforcement to identify suspects, to demonstrate that searches of DTC 
genetic databases circumvent meaningful federal and state law limits placed 
on law enforcements’ searches on CODIS.  Part II outlines Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the applicability of the third-party doctrine.  
Part III applies the third-party doctrine, and the conflicting approaches to it, 
to the disclosure of genetic information to third-party DTC providers. 
Ultimately, in Part IV, this Note asserts that genetic information disclosed 
to a DTC provider is not subject to the third-party doctrine.  It concludes that 
a court, if confronted with this issue, should clearly articulate that the practice 
of investigating genetic information held by DTC providers is presumptively 
a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
I.  GENETIC DATABASING BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
DTC GENETIC PROVIDERS 
Members of law enforcement typically search genetic databases only when 
they cannot obtain matches for a suspect’s DNA in CODIS, which is operated 
by the FBI in cooperation with law enforcement from every state.38  This Part 
provides a comparison of the differences between CODIS and DTC genetic 
databases as a necessary backdrop for understanding the theoretical policy 
implications of allowing law enforcement unfettered access to investigate 
private genetic databases. 
 
 35. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 36. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 37. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 38. See Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family:  Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 316 (2010); Natalie Ram, You Can’t Hide Your Genes, SLATE (May 
4, 2018, 11:42 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/consumer-genetic-databases-
arent-the-only-side-door-for-police-to-get-your-dna.html [https://perma.cc/4TWH-ZKJW]. 
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Part I.A examines the legal limitations imposed by federal and state law 
on the scope of information available in CODIS’s DNA databases and law 
enforcement’s use of CODIS.  Part II.B describes the services that DTC 
providers offer.  This Part makes clear that, in contrast to CODIS, DTC 
providers are subject to little regulatory oversight.  As such, Part II.B explains 
that the primary limits on DTC providers’ collection and sharing of consumer 
data inhere in their individual privacy policies and terms and conditions of 
use. 
A.  CODIS and “Junk” DNA Searches 
Congress authorized the creation of a National DNA Index System (NDIS) 
in the DNA Identification Act of 1994.39  Four years later, CODIS, the 
software program containing this national DNA database, was made 
available to law enforcement.40  Local, state, and federal forensic labs upload 
DNA profiles to CODIS, and the system is monitored by the FBI.41 
Various state and federal laws limit whose and what type of DNA may be 
uploaded to CODIS.  In addition, law enforcement searches for familial DNA 
matches on CODIS are subject to legal restrictions. 
CODIS is composed of several sub-indices of searchable DNA 
databases.42  The indices that are typically used to identify suspects in crimes 
are the “Forensic Index” and the “Offender Index.”43  The Forensic Index 
contains genetic profiles of “unknown origin gathered from crime scenes.”44  
The Offender Index contains “genetic profiles from the pool of individuals 
compelled [by law enforcement] to provide genetic samples.”45 
State and federal law specify the circumstances in which law enforcement 
may compel an individual to subject themselves to a DNA test.  All fifty 
states have laws requiring the collection of DNA from convicted felons, and 
twenty-eight states authorize the collection of DNA from certain arrestees.46  
Federal law likewise authorizes the collection of DNA from arrestees and 
convicted felons.47  As of January 2019, CODIS contained approximately 
 
 39. 34 U.S.C. § 12592 (2012). 
 40. See ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL:  THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DATA 14–16 
(2015). 
 41. See Erin E. Murphy, Relative Doubt:  Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 291, 295–96 (2010); see also Suter, supra note 38, at 315–16. 
 42. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 296. 
 43. See Suter, supra note 38, at 315–16. 
 44. Murphy, supra note 41, at 296. 
 45. Suter, supra note 38, at 316. 
 46. See Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA from Arrestees:  Implementation Lessons, 
NAT’L INST. JUST. J., June 2012, at 18, 20–21.  Notably, of the twenty-eight states authorizing 
arrestee DNA collection, only thirteen states “collect from all persons arrested for any felony 
crime, while the other . . . states limit collection to a subset of felonies that typically involve 
violence or sexual assault.” Id.; see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 451–64 (2013) 
(holding that a Maryland statute authorizing the collection and storage of arrestees’ DNA was 
constitutional because (1) the collection and storage of arrestees’ DNA in CODIS serves 
legitimate state interests, and (2) arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy as 
compared to the public at large). 
 47. See 34 U.S.C. § 40702 (2012). 
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17.1 million DNA profiles of convicts and arrestees and 915,000 forensic 
profiles.48 
Neither the FBI nor any other government agency publishes information 
regarding the racial distribution of offender profiles in CODIS.49  However, 
publicly available reports on the racial composition of arrestees and 
convicted felons in the United States suggest that approximately 41 to 49 
percent of the profiles in the Offender Index likely are of African American 
individuals.50  As a result, an estimated “8.6 percent of the entire African 
American population is currently in the database, compared with only 2 
percent of the white population.”51  Similarly, Hispanic males are 
approximately three times more likely to be incarcerated than white males 
and therefore have greater representation in CODIS.52 
Only certain types of DNA are stored in CODIS’s databases.  Forensic 
DNA testing uses a method referred to as single-tandem repeat (STR) typing, 
which analyzes thirteen different “loci” along strands of an individual’s 
genome.53  Notably, the Court and the medical community at large have 
referred to these loci as “nonprotein coding junk regions of DNA”54 because 
they do not contain genetic material that is “presently recognized as being 
responsible for trait coding.”55  Therefore, these STR loci theoretically do 
not reveal any genetic traits associated with race, sex, medical diseases, or 
other genetic predispositions.56 
Once a DNA profile of an arrestee or convict is entered into CODIS, law 
enforcement can compare the offender’s DNA profile against suspect DNA 
profiles, stored in the Forensic Index, that are linked to particular crime 
scenes.57  An “Offender Candidate Match,” or identification of a suspect 
linked to a crime scene, is present where the DNA profile from a crime scene 
matches the offender’s DNA profile at all loci.58 
However, law enforcement officers also perform familial searches in 
CODIS to identify suspects.  The first type of familial search occurs where 
 
 48. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FBI.GOV (Jan. 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/services/ 
laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/4S54-KNP3]. 
 49. See SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE:  DNA DATA BANKS, 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 257 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 258. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 322. 
 53. Id. at 295. 
 54. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 445 (2013). 
 55. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 56. See King, 569 U.S. at 443; see also MURPHY, supra note 40, at 217.  But see Kincade, 
379 F.3d at 818, 850 (stating that “[b]ecause there are observed group variances in the 
representation of various alleles at the STR loci . . . DNA profiles derived by STR may yield 
probabilistic evidence of the contributor’s race or sex”).  In addition, the court later noted that 
DNA analysis of STRs could potentially reveal “the presence of traits for thousands of known 
diseases, and countless numbers of diseases which are currently unknown.” Id. 
 57. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 296. 
 58. See FBI LAB., NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
MANUAL 54–56 (2018), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndis-operational-procedures-
manual.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/6MU8-D9CQ]; see also Suter, supra note 38, at 314. 
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an officer runs an offender profile through CODIS and it is a “partial match” 
to a suspect DNA profile derived from a crime scene.59  A partial match 
suggests that the offender profile may be a “close biological relative” of the 
suspect DNA profile and narrows the pool of likely suspects.60  In addition, 
law enforcement may perform “intentional” familial searches.61  If the police 
have an existing suspect who cannot be compelled to provide DNA, they may 
“attempt to obtain the suspect’s DNA indirectly by analyzing DNA from his 
family members” and comparing those family members’ samples to the DNA 
sample from the crime scene.62 
B.  DTC Genetic Testing Providers’ Databases 
DTC providers have an expansive database of information related to 
voluntary consumers of their genetic testing services and typically test for a 
wider scope of genetic markers than those tested by law enforcement for 
CODIS.  This section focuses on Ancestry and 23andMe, two of the leading 
DTC providers, to illustrate the scope of private genetic databases and the 
policies typically surrounding their use. 
Part I.B.1 provides statistics on each company’s consumer base, and Part 
I.B.2 clarifies the type of genetic information that these companies test for.  
Next, Part I.B.3 describes the privacy policies and terms of use that 
consumers enter into when disclosing their genetic information to DTC 
providers.  Finally, Part I.B.4 describes how the process of conducting 
familial searches on DTC genetic databases would likely occur. 
1.  Demographics 
Consumer demand for DTC genetic testing has increased exponentially in 
the past five years.  In 2013, 330,000 individuals submitted their DNA for 
testing to a variety of major DTC providers, including Ancestry and 
23andMe.63  By 2018, the number of individuals who submitted their DNA 
to DTC providers dramatically increased to approximately 12.275 million.64  
Indeed, in 2017 and 2018 alone, 7.8 million individuals had their DNA tested 
by DTC providers.65  Most of the individuals tested are located in the United 
States, and as a result, an estimated “1 in 25 American adults now have access 
to [their] personal genetic data.”66 
Recent figures provided by Ancestry and 23andMe suggest that those 
statistics may already be out of date.  Ancestry is the largest DTC provider 
 
 59. See Suter, supra note 38, at 318–19. 
 60. Id. at 319. 
 61. See id. at 326. 
 62. Id. at 320. 
 63. See Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-
year-consumer-dna-testing-blew-up [https://perma.cc/A3JS-FV8L]. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
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in the market,67 and it states that its consumer DNA database is currently 
composed of over ten million individual profiles.68  23andMe follows as the 
second largest DTC provider, and it has disclosed that approximately five 
million consumers have submitted their DNA for testing.69 
DTC providers evidently store the genetic information of a vast number of 
individuals within their databases.  Notably, however, most of these 
consumers are Americans of European descent.70  Specifically, nearly 80 
percent of individuals in databases from genetic studies tend to be of 
European descent.71  By comparison, individuals of East Asian ancestry are 
the second most prevalent, at only 9 percent, and likely less than 4 percent of 
individuals in genetic databases are of neither European nor Asian descent.72 
2.  Scope of Information 
23andMe and Ancestry both require that individuals seeking testing 
services provide a sample of their saliva for testing.73  The companies’ 
laboratories then use that saliva sample to test the “coding” regions of the 
consumer’s DNA for single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).74  SNPs are 
“variations in the DNA sequence at particular locations” which “generate 
biological variation between people.”75  The variations in the genome 
revealed by SNPs have been statistically correlated with certain “medical 
conditions, behavioral differences, and even ‘recreational’ traits (like curly 
hair or a preference for cilantro).”76 
Ancestry and 23andMe therefore acquire two forms of data from their 
consumers:  (1) the saliva provided by the consumer (the “biological 
sample”); and (2) the genetic test results derived from that sample (the 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. Company Facts, ANCESTRY, http://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/ 
company-facts [https://perma.cc/X8GG-7GYT] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 69. See About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/DUZ7-Y72X] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 70. See Brian Resnick, How Your Third Cousin’s Ancestry Test Could Jeopardize Your 
Privacy, VOX (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2018/10/12/17957268/science-ancestry-dna-privacy [https://perma.cc/794W-676G]; 
see also Sarah Zhang, 23andMe Wants Its DNA Data to Be Less White, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/04/23andme-diversity-dna/558575 
[https://perma.cc/S82M-TEAZ]. 
 71. See Zhang, supra note 70; see also Joannella Morales et al., A Standardized 
Framework for Representation of Ancestry Data in Genomics Studies, with Application to the 
NHGRI-EBI GWAS Catalog, GENOME BIOLOGY, Feb. 15, 2018, at 4, 
https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13059-018-1396-2 
[https://perma.cc/KB4F-R5A3]. 
 72. See Morales et al., supra note 71, at 4. 
 73. See Molteni, supra note 9. 
 74. See What Are SNPs?, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/gen101/snps 
[https://perma.cc/3SWZ-69DR] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); see also AncestryDNA—
Frequently Asked Questions (United States), ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/ 
legal/us/faq [https://perma.cc/T4B7-AYLF] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 75. See What Are SNPs?, supra note 74. 
 76. Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 (2015). 
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“genetic information”).77  The nature of the genetic information available in 
these databases, however, depends on what type of genetic testing services 
the company provides. 
DTC providers tend to offer two types of personal genetic testing services:  
ancestral analyses and medical analyses.78  The ancestral analyses purport to 
reveal evidence of an individual’s ethnic background based on certain genetic 
markers.79  In addition, these tests reveal any direct or distant relatives of the 
individual in their databases who have similarly submitted their genetic 
material for analysis.80 
Medical genetic tests performed by DTC providers typically analyze an 
individual’s DNA for a host of genetic variants associated with certain 
diseases or medical conditions.81  Ancestry does not offer medical genetic 
tests to the public at this time.82  23andMe, however, offers medical testing 
services as an add-on to its standard ancestry DNA test for an increased 
price.83  23andMe’s medical DNA tests identify whether the individual has 
any genetic variations that are statistically associated with certain “health 
risks,” like late-onset Alzheimer’s disease, celiac disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, and the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene mutations associated with an 
increased risk of breast cancer in women.84  In addition, 23andMe tests the 
individual’s DNA to determine if they are a “carrier” for certain inherited 
conditions like cystic fibrosis or sickle cell anemia.85 
Accordingly, DTC providers like Ancestry and 23andMe hold within their 
databases detailed information regarding millions of their consumers’ ethnic, 
familial, and, in some cases, medical backgrounds. 
 
 77. See Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy 
[https://perma.cc/6EVH-ZKLW] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); Your Privacy, ANCESTRY 
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement [https://perma.cc/ 
D3DF-SZPY]. 
 78. See Ram, supra note 76, at 888–89. 
 79. See Our Services:  Ancestry, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-ancestry 
[https://perma.cc/7H6P-BQGE] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); see also AncestryDNA, 
ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna [https://perma.cc/8PXN-AGAD] (last visited Apr. 
10, 2019). 
 80. See Our Services:  Ancestry, supra note 79; see also AncestryDNA, supra note 79. 
 81. See Ram, supra note 76, at 889. 
 82. Ancestry does have a separate service that is currently in beta testing, AncestryHealth, 
which allows users to build a family tree that includes familial health history and genetic data. 
Sarah Buhr, Ancestry.com Welcomes AncestryHealth to the Family, TECHCRUNCH, 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/07/16/ancestry-com-welcomes-ancestryhealth-to-the-family 
[https://perma.cc/X2L8-PZ3R] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 83. See Health + Ancestry Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-health-
ancestry [https://perma.cc/PAL6-2HRJ] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
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3.  Privacy Policies and Terms of Use 
Unlike CODIS, DTC providers are not subject to targeted and 
comprehensive federal and state regulation.86  There are federal and state 
laws regulating “aspects of genetic testing and the resulting genetic data,” 
but these laws are of limited applicability to DTC providers.87  The “Privacy 
Rule” of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
of 199688 governs private parties’ use and disclosure of “individually 
identifiable health information,” such as genetic information, to private 
parties and law enforcement.89  However, DTC providers likely do not 
qualify as a “covered entity” under HIPAA.90  The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 200891 additionally limits the use and 
disclosure of genetic information by covered entities.92  GINA, however, 
only applies to employers and health insurers and therefore, like HIPAA, 
does not cover the disclosure of genetic information by DTC providers.93 
As a result, the privacy policies and terms of use of DTC providers 
predominantly determine the scope of consumers’ rights to their disclosed 
genetic information and how the provider can use and share that data.  In 
particular, Ancestry and 23andMe reserve certain rights with respect to 
consumers’ biological samples and genetic information. 
a.  Ownership of Genetic Information 
Each company’s terms explicitly state that its users retain ownership of the 
genetic information obtained from their biological samples.94  However, the 
 
 86. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?:  A Survey 
of the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 
28 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 35, 39–42 (2018). 
 87. Id. at 39. 
 88. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to 1320d-6 (2012). 
 90. Pursuant to HIPAA, “covered entities” include “health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and . . . any health care provider who transmits health information in 
electronic form in connection with transactions for which the Secretary of HHS has adopted 
standards under HIPAA.” OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2 (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/privacysummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DWK-V836].  However, DTC providers 
“are usually careful to explain that they are not engaged in health care or the manipulation or 
provision of health data” in order to exempt themselves from HIPAA coverage. Natalie Ram 
et al., Genealogy Databases and the Future of Criminal Investigations, 360 SCIENCE 1078, 
1078 (2018); see also, e.g., 23andMe Genetic Health Risk Reports:  What You Should Know, 
23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/test-info [https://perma.cc/9QE6-DLVL] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019) (stating that “Genetic Health Risk reports . . . do not diagnose cancer or any 
other health conditions or determine medical action”). 
 91. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2012). 
 93. See Ram et al., supra note 90, at 1078. 
 94. Ancestry’s terms state that “[y]ou always maintain ownership of your data,” but 
Ancestry reserves the right to “collect, host, transfer, process, analyze, communicate and store 
your Personal Information (including your Genetic Information).” Ancestry Terms and 
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terms also stipulate that consumers’ ownership rights in their genetic 
information remain subject to each company’s rights to analyze, store, and, 
in some instances, share that genetic information pursuant to its terms of 
service and privacy policy.95 
Specifically, each company states that a consumer grants the company a 
“license” to use his or her provided data, including genetic information, as it 
sees fit.  Ancestry’s terms explain that its consumers “grant Ancestry a 
sublicensable, worldwide, royalty-free license to host, store, copy, publish, 
distribute, provide access to, create derivative works of, and otherwise 
use . . . User Provided Content.”96  23andMe goes one step further and states 
that its users “assign[] a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and 
non-exclusive license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate, publish, 
publicly perform, publicly display, distribute, reproduce, edit, reformat, and 
create derivative works from any [submitted] User Content.”97  Thus, 
although these DTC providers apparently disavow their ownership rights in 
consumer genetic information, they nonetheless retain a significant 
proprietary interest in such information. 
b.  Disclosure of Genetic Information 
Each company’s terms of service and privacy policy specifies two 
circumstances in which a consumer’s genetic information might be shared 
with a third party.  First, the companies may, with the consumer’s informed 
consent, share the consumer’s genetic information with third-party 
businesses or partners for “research” purposes.98  These companies’ 
informed-consent forms specify that any identifying information associated 
with the genetic information is removed before sharing the data with the 
third-party research partner or company.99 
Second, the privacy policies make clear that Ancestry and 23andMe may 
share a consumer’s genetic information with public authorities if required to 
by law.100  Both companies state that they require “valid legal process” in 
 
Conditions, ANCESTRY (June 5, 2018), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions 
[https://perma.cc/7WDQ-L7PY].  23andMe’s terms specify that “[a]ny Genetic Information 
derived from your saliva remains your information, subject to rights [23andMe] retain[s] as 
set forth in [the Terms of Service].” Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/ 
about/tos [https://perma.cc/TD4W-3T7K] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 95. See supra note 94. 
 96. Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 94. 
 97. Terms of Service, supra note 94 (emphasis added). 
 98. See Privacy Highlights, supra note 77; Your Privacy, supra note 77; see also Valerie 
Gutmann Koch, PGTandMe:  Social Networking-Based Genetic Testing and the Evolving 
Research Model, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 50 (2012). 
 99. See AncestryDNA Informed Consent, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/dna-redirect/informedconsent-v4-en [https://perma.cc/Y2RX-
F2JN]; Research Consent Document, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/consent 
[https://perma.cc/P95U-S8PG] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 100. Privacy Highlights, supra note 77; Your Privacy, supra note 77. 
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order to produce information to the authorities.101  23andMe states that valid 
“legal or regulatory process” includes “a valid court order, subpoena, or 
search warrant for genetic or Personal Information.”102  Ancestry similarly 
defines “legal process” as broadly including, “e.g., subpoenas [and] 
warrants.”103  The scope of what sort of legal requests might constitute “valid 
legal process” under these companies’ privacy policies and terms of use 
consequently appears wide and unclear. 
At the time of publication, 23andMe continues to assert that it has not 
shared any of its consumers’ genetic information with law enforcement.104  
Ancestry, however, complied with a 2014 warrant for genetic information in 
its databases obtained by the Idaho Falls Police Department in connection 
with the 1996 rape and murder of a local resident named Angie Dodge.105  
Ancestry ran a DNA sample of the suspect through one of its genetic 
databases and initially provided the police with results of its search.106  These 
results revealed a partial genetic match in its databases but not the name of 
the individual connected to the partial genetic match.107  A subsequent court 
order, however, compelled Ancestry to provide the name of the match.108  It 
is possible that, should law enforcement seek to find familial matches to a 
potential suspect’s profile on a private genetic database, it would issue a 
similar request to a DTC provider. 
4.  Familial Searches 
The matches to a suspect’s profile on a genetic database typically identify 
distant relatives of the suspect, such as second or third cousins.109  For this 
reason, some scientists have referred to the practice of searching genetic 
databases for relatives of a suspect as conducting “long-range familial 
searches.”110 
A 2018 study suggests that long-range familial searches are highly 
effective in narrowing down lists of potential suspects of European 
descent.111  In the study, a group of computer scientists and genetic 
specialists analyzed a “dataset of 1.28 million individuals who were tested 
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with a DTC provider.”112  This dataset was manipulated so that any “first 
cousin and closer relationships” were eliminated from the tested pool of 
individuals.113  The study projected that “60% of the searches for individuals 
of European descent will result in a third-cousin or closer match.”114  As for 
the relative success of long-range familial searches in identifying suspects, 
the study asserted that creating family trees and using “demographic 
information, such as geography, age, and sex,” to narrow down suspects 
typically resulted in a list of sixteen to seventeen potential suspects.115 
Law enforcement officials ordinarily turn to genetic databases only when 
they are unable identify a suspect using CODIS or other traditional 
investigative means.116  DTC providers are therefore a valuable resource for 
law enforcement investigations because of their capacity to generate a small 
suspect pool when no leads have otherwise materialized for months, years, 
or even decades. 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INFORMATION STORED 
BY THIRD PARTIES 
Long-range familial searches on DTC genetic databases are a powerful 
tool for law enforcement to identify suspects in unsolved crimes.  23andMe 
and Ancestry, for their part, have either explicitly or implicitly indicated their 
intent to resist law enforcement requests to investigate their genetic 
databases.117  However, whether these companies can demand that law 
enforcement obtain a warrant to access their stored genetic information 
depends on whether consumers’ privacy interests in their genetic information 
are protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Fourth Amendment establishes the “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures” by the government.118  This Part outlines the varying 
understandings of the third-party doctrine that shape the determination of 
whether law enforcement’s use of DTC genetic databases to perform long-
range familial searches for suspects would constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Part II.A provides a brief overview of the warrant clause and 
constitutionally protected realms of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.  
Part II.B explains how the third-party doctrine affects those privacy interests.  
 
 112. Erlich et al., supra note 110, at 690. 
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This Part then describes how Carpenter v. United States119 has limited the 
third-party doctrine by recognizing that it does not apply to privacy interests 
in certain kinds of information.  Finally, this Part details what additional 
factors courts currently take into consideration in determining whether the 
third-party doctrine applies to particular forms of data stored by third parties. 
A.  The Fourth Amendment, Warrants, and Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy 
The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment largely in response to 
Britain’s use of general warrants and writs of assistance during the colonial 
period.120  General warrants and writs of assistance effectively authorized 
British officials to conduct “sweeping searches and seizures [of private 
property at will and] without any evidentiary basis.”121  Accordingly, the 
Framers intended that the Fourth Amendment protect an individual’s privacy 
interests in his or her property by requiring that the government obtain a 
warrant supported by “probable cause” before conducting a search or 
seizure.122 
Each and every police investigation of an individual and their property is 
not presumptively a search under the Fourth Amendment.123  Traditionally, 
a Fourth Amendment search occurred only where law enforcement 
physically trespassed upon an individual’s private property.124  However, in 
Katz v. United States,125 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects 
“people, not places,” and, therefore, could not exclusively “turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”126  
Instead, the Court held that what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”127 
Justice John Marshall Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz, asserted 
that the majority had set up a two-pronged evaluation for the Fourth 
Amendment.  Harlan specified that the Katz analysis requires:  (1) “that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and 
(2) “that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
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‘reasonable.’”128  Subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has articulated 
various doctrinal approaches to the “reasonableness” prong under Harlan’s 
test with regard to particular forms of what an individual subjectively deems 
“private” under the Fourth Amendment. 
B.  The Applicability of the Third-Party Doctrine in the Information Age 
In Smith v. Maryland,129 the Court articulated the standard now known as 
the third-party doctrine, which holds that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”130  Therefore, an individual gives up “all of his Fourth Amendment 
rights” in any information disclosed to a third party.131  Indeed, courts have 
held that this standard holds true “even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”132  Accordingly, under the 
third-party doctrine, bank records,133 telephone records,134 and IP 
addresses135 are not protected under the Fourth Amendment and may be 
obtained by law enforcement from a third party without a warrant. 
In Carpenter, however, the Court drastically revised its prior stance of 
strictly precluding information disclosed to third parties from Fourth 
Amendment protections.136  While disclosure of information to a third party 
suggests that an individual has a “reduced expectation of privacy,” the Court 
asserted that possessing “diminished privacy interests” in information does 
not act as a per se bar to the application of the Fourth Amendment.137  
Individuals do not, the Court specified, abandon all expectations of privacy 
“by venturing into the public sphere” and engaging with third-party 
providers.138  Instead, the Court implied that if disclosures made to a third 
party have the potential to reveal fundamentally personal and intimate 
information, an individual has not conclusively forfeited his or her Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests in the information through the disclosure.139 
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A strict rendering of the third-party doctrine is premised on a theory of 
assumption of risk by the disclosing party.  This assumption-of-risk theory 
has been supplemented by Carpenter’s emphasis on evaluating the nature 
and scope of particular information provided to third parties.  However, there 
is a minority approach described in Carpenter that suggests that expectations 
regarding proprietary rights in particular forms of information shape an 
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy in information disclosed to a 
third party.  This alternative approach has strong support in the traditional, 
property-based conception of the Fourth Amendment. 
1.  Assumption of Risk and the Strict Application 
of the Third-Party Doctrine 
Assumption of risk is the traditional rationale for strictly excluding 
information disclosed to third parties from Fourth Amendment protections.  
As the Court articulated in United States v. Miller,140 an individual “takes the 
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed 
by that person to the government.”141  The underpinnings of this theory are 
thus relatively simple:  when individuals expose their information to a third 
party, they risk subsequent exposure of that information to a wider net of 
individuals and entities.  Fortunately or not, that wider net may include law 
enforcement.  Because third parties have no “meaningful interests in records 
sought by a subpoena . . . [they therefore] have no rights to object to the 
records’ disclosure—much less to assert that the Government must obtain a 
warrant to compel disclosure of the records.”142  As a result, under this 
approach, law enforcement officials are entitled to investigate any 
information disclosed to a third-party business without a warrant, regardless 
of whether the disclosing individual or third party objects. 
2.  Carpenter’s Expansion of Privacy Protections Under 
the Third-Party Doctrine 
In Carpenter, the Court rejected the strict application of the third-party 
doctrine to cell-site records maintained by telephone companies.143  The 
Court asserted that, because a cell phone “logs a cell-site record . . . without 
any affirmative act on the part of the user” and using a cell phone is essential 
to daily life, it is inappropriate to assume that the user voluntarily assumes 
the risk of disclosure of his or her cell-site records to law enforcement.144  
Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, contended that 
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the third-party doctrine is not exclusively premised on assumption of risk.145  
Rather, Roberts asserted, the Court additionally had “considered ‘the nature 
of the particular documents sought’ to determine whether ‘there is a 
legitimate “expectation of privacy” concerning their contents.’”146 
The Court then specified that the “depth” and “comprehensive reach” of 
cell-site data were highly relevant considerations in evaluating the nature of 
this particular form of information.147  Paul Ohm, a recognized scholar in 
information privacy law, has more broadly framed these lines of inquiry in 
Carpenter.148  Professor Ohm asserts that the “depth” prong in Carpenter 
considers the “detail and precision of the information stored.”149  The 
“comprehensive reach” prong then specifically addresses the “number of 
people tracked in the database.”150 
Pursuant to Carpenter, if the depth and comprehensive reach of the 
particular information disclosed to a third party threatens a “too permeating 
police surveillance” and compromises individuals’ personal security, there 
may be justifiable grounds to designate that information as protected under 
the Fourth Amendment.151  The Court also stated that the “deeply revealing 
nature” of cell-site data, its “breadth,” and the “inescapable and automatic 
nature of its collection” justified protection of such data under the Fourth 
Amendment.152 
This Note limits its scope to the “depth” and “comprehensive reach” 
prongs of the Carpenter analysis because the “deeply revealing nature” of 
the particular form of information is also analyzed as part of the “depth” 
prong.153  The considerations of “breadth” and the “inescapable and 
automatic nature of collection” are addressed to the passive collection by 
third parties of numerous data points over a prolonged period of time.154  
Because genetic data is collected by DTC providers only once, as a result of 
an active disclosure by the consumer, these considerations are not applicable 
to private genetic databases.  Parts II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b therefore evaluate 
only the relevant legal and policy inquiries under the depth and 
comprehensive reach prongs in greater detail. 
 
 145. Id. at 2219–20. 
 146. Id. at 2219 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442).  In Smith and Miller, the Court ultimately 
concluded that, because records of checks and telephone logs do not reveal information we 
distinctly view as private, Fourth Amendment protection of the respective disclosures was 
unwarranted. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43. 
 147. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 148. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 15), https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/bsedj/ [https://perma.cc/2APS-
LT7M]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 152. Id. at 2223. 
 153. See infra Part II.B.2.a; see also Ohm, supra note 148 (manuscript at 15). 
 154. See Ohm, supra note 148 (manuscript at 15, 19–21). 
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a.  Depth of Information Available in Third-Party Databases 
The Carpenter Court ultimately declined to extend the third-party doctrine 
to cell-site records held by phone companies because these records, by 
revealing every single locale an individual visits each day, inappropriately 
provided the government with “an intimate window into a person’s life.”155  
In making this determination, the Court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s 
observation, in her concurring opinion to United States v. Jones,156 that “a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements [reveals] a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations” and that there are associated risks of granting the 
government access to such intimate records.157 
Justice Sotomayor implied in Jones that a Fourth Amendment analysis 
should consider whether the data held by a third party reveals information 
that is more broadly recognized by the Court as “private” under the U.S. 
Constitution and consequently outside the scope of information that the 
government should have unfettered access to.158  For example, the Court has 
consistently deemed that intimate details regarding familial decision-making 
and sexual behavior are within a “zone of privacy” protected by the Bill of 
Rights, which must remain free from “governmental intrusion.”159  
Comprehensive records of an individual’s physical movement, in 
theoretically revealing to the government that she visited “[an] abortion 
clinic, [an] AIDS treatment center . . . [or] a gay bar,” therefore potentially 
implicated those constitutionally recognized realms of sexual and familial 
privacy.160  Sotomayor thus suggested in Jones that if the “depth” of 
information revealed by location-based records is inherently private under 
the Constitution, law enforcement could not obtain such information without 
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 
b.  Comprehensive Reach of Third-Party Databases 
In Carpenter, the Court suggested that the third-party doctrine should not 
be applied to information databases with a reach that could permit the 
government to surveil substantially all, or a vast majority of, people in the 
 
 155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 156. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 157. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 158. See id. 
 159. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965) (holding that the “sacred 
precincts of [the] marital bedroom” are not subject to government intrusion); see also, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (protecting “personal choice regarding 
marriage” from government intrusion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) 
(protecting sexual behavior from government intrusion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453 (1972) (protecting the decision to procreate from government intrusion); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (protecting the “private realm of family life” from 
government intrusion). 
 160. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)). 
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United States.161  Roberts’s assertion is strongly supported by an originalist 
perspective on the Fourth Amendment.  As stated previously, a primary 
object of the Framers in drafting the Fourth Amendment was to foreclose 
widespread searches of individuals and their property by the government 
without probable cause.162  In another case, Justice Antonin Scalia asserted 
that the Framers therefore intended for the Fourth Amendment to prohibit 
suspicionless searches of individuals if their “principal end is ordinary crime-
solving.”163  Instead, Scalia contended that, absent “special needs,” 
individualized suspicion of criminal guilt was necessary to conduct a 
search.164 
The third-party doctrine risks allowing government officials to conduct 
suspicionless searches with impunity by permitting the collection and 
indefinite retention of intimate, third-party data on millions of private 
citizens.  As Daniel Solove, a scholar in privacy and information security, 
has stated, “as more private sector data becomes available to the government, 
there could be a de facto national database, or a large database of ‘suspicious’ 
individuals,” that law enforcement officials could search at will.165  The 
judiciary, therefore, may additionally consider the privacy risks of allowing 
the government unrestricted access to search the personal information of an 
extremely wide breadth of individuals, without individualized suspicion, in 
evaluating whether the third-party doctrine applies. 
3.  Proprietary Interests in Information Stored by Third Parties 
An alternative to the majority approach in Carpenter calls for premising 
the applicability of the third-party doctrine on the proprietary interests of the 
disclosing individual in his or her information.  Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
in his Carpenter dissent, criticized the majority’s assertion that Miller and 
Smith v. Maryland166 permitted a content-based analysis of the disclosed 
information to determine if the third-party doctrine applies.167  Instead, 
Kennedy contended, at the crux of the third-party doctrine is the notion that 
that individuals must have a “sufficient connection to the thing or place 
searched to assert Fourth Amendment interests in it.”168  He asserted that 
property concepts bear heavily on the determination of whether individuals 
maintain this requisite “connection” to information held by a third party.169 
 
 161. See United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018). 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 469 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 469–70. 
 165. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2002). 
 166. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 167. United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
Justice Kennedy asserted that, to the contrary, the Court in both cases affirmed that the third-
party doctrine applies “even when the records contain personal and sensitive information.” Id. 
at 2223. 
 168. Id. at 2227. 
 169. Id. 
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Kennedy’s return to a property-based conception of reasonable 
expectations of privacy was not without modern precedent.  In United States 
v. Jones, Justice Scalia criticized interpretations of Katz that suggest its 
analysis foreclosed a consideration of an individual’s property interests under 
the Fourth Amendment.170  By contrast, Scalia asserted, Katz’s call for 
judicial evaluation of the “reasonableness” of an individual’s subjective 
expectations permits a consideration of “either . . . concepts of real or 
personal property law or . . . understandings that are recognized and 
permitted by society.”171  Concepts of property law therefore may inform 
whether an individual maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information disclosed to and held by a third party.172  Where, as part of the 
transaction with the third party, an individual does not “own, possess, 
control, or use the records” held by the third party, Kennedy asserted, he or 
she has “no reasonable expectation that [those records] cannot be disclosed 
pursuant to lawful compulsory process.”173 
Three different concepts of property law predominate in evaluating an 
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy in particular property.  First, 
the Court has emphasized that an individual maintains an unwavering 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the sanctity of the home.174  
Specifically, in the home “all details are intimate details.”175  Thus, even 
where the government does not physically intrude in a home but employs 
“sense-enhancing technology” to obtain intimate details from within the 
home, an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy have been invaded 
under the Fourth Amendment.176 
Second, where an individual grants their property to a third party, the 
judiciary might consider whether the transaction was merely a bailment to 
the third party or effected a full transfer of ownership rights.177  This 
perspective considers the scope of ownership and use granted to the third 
party by the individual via the transaction.  Kennedy, in his Carpenter 
dissent, asserted that granting a third-party company the right to use and 
control business records, such as cell-site or other telephone records, was not 
a bailment and established full abdication of ownership rights to the third 
party.178  By contrast, Justice Gorsuch suggested that the entrustment of 
records to a third party is better understood as a bailment.179  As a “bailor,” 
an individual does not “lose any Fourth Amendment interest in [his or her 
data]” by entrusting it to a third party.180  Indeed, as “bailee,” the third party 
 
 170. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012). 
 171. Id. at 408 (emphasis added) (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)). 
 172. See Carpenter, 138 U.S. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at. 2224. 
 174. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); see also Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 34–38 (2001). 
 175. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
 176. Id. at 34. 
 177. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 2268–69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 2269. 
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should protect the bailor’s private property to the extent the bailor likely 
would deem necessary.181  Third parties, as bailees, consequently might have 
the standing to require that law enforcement obtain a warrant to search 
property within their databases pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 
Finally, existing sources of positive law that specify ownership rights in 
certain forms of information necessarily shape the disclosing party’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy.182  As Gorsuch asserts, if federal or state 
law specifies that customers retain a proprietary interest in certain forms of 
information that might be disclosed to third parties, such laws should govern 
an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy in that information.183 
III.  APPLICATION OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE TO GENETIC 
INFORMATION DISCLOSED TO DTC PROVIDERS 
At the time of publication, a law enforcement request to access genetic 
information from a DTC provider has not been challenged in court.  
However, if law enforcement officials attempt to acquire such data in the 
future, larger DTC providers like 23andMe and Ancestry will presumably 
use their collective legal might to resist such requests and protect consumer 
trust in their multimillion-dollar genetic testing enterprises.184  In addition, it 
is possible that an individual implicated by a relative’s genetic information 
in a DTC genetic database might attempt to exclude that evidence from trial.  
It is therefore reasonably probable that the judiciary will have to determine 
whether genetic information voluntarily disclosed to a DTC provider is 
subject to Fourth Amendment protections in the near future.  This Part applies 
the conflicting theories surrounding the third-party doctrine articulated in 
Part II.B to the disclosure of genetic information to a third-party DTC 
provider. 
Part III.A specifies the individuals and entities whose privacy interests are 
likely implicated through investigations of DTC genetic databases.  Part III.B 
analyzes how a strict application of the third-party doctrine could suggest 
that law enforcement’s investigation of genetic information held by DTC 
providers does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Finally, 
Part III.C examines the alternative perspective that the third-party doctrine 
does not apply to stored genetic data given the sensitive nature of information 
revealed by genetic material and the relative proprietary interests associated 
with disclosed genetic information. 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 2270. 
 183. Id. 
 184. As Orin Kerr has asserted, consumer trust is key to the business model of many third-
party providers and such providers are therefore often willing to go to court to protect 
consumer data. See Kerr, supra note 131, at 598. 
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A.  Privacy Interests at Stake in Law Enforcement Investigations 
of DTC Genetic Databases 
As a threshold matter, it is important to note whose privacy interests are 
potentially implicated by law enforcement searches of DTC providers.  Sonia 
Suter, a scholar in bioethics and genetic privacy, has identified three different 
entities whose privacy interests are implicated in the related context of 
familial searches in CODIS185:  (1) the “genetic informant” or “pivot person” 
whose DNA is in CODIS and provides a partial match to a DNA sample from 
a crime scene (the “Informant”);186 (2) the relatives of the Informant who are 
investigated as suspects as a result of the partial match in CODIS (the 
“Targets”);187 and (3) the “family unit as a whole,” whose intimate familial 
ties are subject to investigation by law enforcement (the “Collective”).188 
While Professor Suter was writing about CODIS, her categorization can 
be applied to law enforcement searches of DTC genetic databases.  Here, the 
Informant is the individual who provides his or her genetic information to a 
third-party DTC provider.  The Target is the “fourth-party” relative who is 
unwittingly implicated as a result of his or her family member submitting her 
genetic information to a DTC provider.  Finally, the Collective is the entire 
familial unit who shares varying degrees of genetic material with the 
Informant and the Target.  This Note focuses on the Informant’s privacy 
interests because his or her disclosure to the DTC provider potentially 
triggers the third-party doctrine.189  However, the privacy interests of the 
Target and the Collective may impact the analysis in terms of reasonable 
expectations of privacy regarding familial relationships and genetic 
information.  In addition, the interests of the Collective may bear on relative 
proprietary interests in the disclosed genetic information. 
B.  The Third-Party Doctrine as Applicable to Genetic Information: 
Law Enforcement’s Right to Perform Warrantless Searches 
Law enforcement officials seeking to perform warrantless searches of 
DTC providers’ databases would likely argue that the Informant cannot claim 
 
 185. Suter, supra note 38, at 328. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Notably, there are standing problems that would prevent these three entities from 
bringing a Fourth Amendment claim.  The Informant likely would not have standing to invoke 
the exclusionary rule in court. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (holding that 
“it is proper to permit only [criminal] defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule’s protections”).  Similarly, the Target can only 
allege that evidence should be excluded as an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment if 
his or her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. See id.; see also Murphy, supra note 
41, at 33.  The standing issue is outside the scope of inquiry of this Note; however, both Erin 
Murphy and Mary Coombs have made powerful arguments that the Target should have 
standing to assert his or her Fourth Amendment right to protect shared privacy interests with 
the Informant, or on behalf of the privacy interests of the Informant. See Murphy, supra note 
41, at 336.  See generally Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the 
Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593 (1987). 
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any reasonable expectation of privacy in genetic information voluntarily 
disclosed to a DTC provider.  As a result, law enforcement would not be 
required to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to request genetic 
information from DTC providers. 
The assumption-of-risk theory underlying the third-party doctrine supports 
the notion that the Informant maintains no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in disclosed genetic information.  Furthermore, the alternative approaches to 
the applicability of the third-party doctrine that are articulated in Carpenter 
do not alter the analysis in the context of genetic databases. 
1.  Assumption of the Risk of Law Enforcement Exposure 
A strict application of the third-party doctrine pursuant to Smith and Miller 
could suggest that the Informant voluntarily assumes the risk of disclosure of 
his or her genetic information to law enforcement through interacting with a 
DTC provider.  Indeed, consumers who provide their genetic information to 
third-party providers potentially waive, both implicitly and explicitly, any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that data. 
On the one hand, implicit in the Informant’s act of submitting a biological 
sample to a DTC provider is the subsequent exposure of his or her genetic 
information to a wide range of entities.190  This scope of exposure includes 
the DTC provider, external labs that analyze the Informant’s biological 
sample, and any consumer who shares genetic information with the 
Informant and similarly has submitted their genetic information for testing to 
the company.191  Furthermore, the Informant often consents to an even wider 
net of exposure when he or she provides informed consent to share the 
disclosed genetic information with external research and business 
partners.192  Although this information is technically deidentified when 
shared with the third party, extensive media coverage suggests that it is 
relatively easy for such genetic information to be “deanonymized” by 
scientists.193  Pursuant to Smith and Miller, then, the Informant has 
voluntarily assumed the risk that any number of those individuals or entities 
could reveal his or her genetic information to the authorities.194 
On the other hand, volitional assumption of risk need not be implied 
because the Informant explicitly contracts with the DTC provider to accept 
 
 190. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 191. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 192. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 193. See, e.g., Peter Pitts, The Privacy Delusions of Genetic Testing, FORBES (Feb. 15, 
2017, 1:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/15/the-privacy-delusions-of-
genetic-testing [https://perma.cc/84VP-WB2N]; see also Ifeoma Ajunwa, Opinion, Can a 
Genetic Test Be Anonymous?:  There’s No Guarantee of Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES:  ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (Mar. 4, 2017, 7:22 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/ 
03/02/23andme-and-the-promise-of-anonymous-genetic-testing-10/theres-no-guarantee-of-
anonymity [https://perma.cc/SA6E-ZE8Q]. 
 194. See supra Part II.B.1; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) 
(holding that information disclosed to a third-party individual who later becomes a police 
informant is not protected under the Fourth Amendment). 
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the risk of exposure of his or her genetic information to law enforcement.  
Prior to ordering a genetic testing kit from 23andMe or Ancestry, the 
consumer must create an account on the company’s website.195  In creating 
an account, the consumer is directed to read and consent to the company’s 
terms of use and privacy policies.196 
On 23andMe, the individual must click a box indicating that they have 
“read and agree to” the terms of service and privacy policy before creating 
an account.197  On Ancestry, a statement indicates that by clicking a box 
marked “save and continue” the individual agrees to the terms of use and 
privacy statements.198  The terms and privacy policies explicitly state that the 
companies may be required to hand over any information disclosed by the 
Informant to law enforcement.199  These “clickwrap” contractual terms are 
typically binding on consumers, so long as they have adequate notice of terms 
before they indicate their consent.200  This informed consent to the risk of 
law enforcement exposure vis-à-vis the clickwrap terms of DTC providers’ 
consumer contracts therefore arguably establishes voluntary assumption of 
the risk pursuant to the third-party doctrine.201 
In addition, the Court in Carpenter in part determined that cell-site records 
were excludable from the third-party doctrine because assumption of risk 
could not be presumed in the particular context of cell phone usage.  Because 
using a cell phone is “indispensable to participation in modern society,”202 
the Court held that a consumer virtually has no choice but to disclose a 
variety of highly detailed information to the cell phone provider and therefore 
does not voluntarily assume the risk of exposure of that information to law 
enforcement.203 
By contrast, transacting in genetic information with companies like 
23andMe and Ancestry is likely not a social or economic necessity.  Knowing 
one’s genetic background may impact one’s understanding of her ethnic 
makeup and medical propensities; however, this knowledge is probably not 
a practical necessity in order to understand one’s personhood or function in 
 
 195. See ANCESTRY, supra note 14; 23ANDME, supra note 13. 
 196. See ANCESTRY, supra note 14; 23ANDME, supra note 13. 
 197. See 23ANDME, supra note 13. 
 198. See ANCESTRY, supra note 14. 
 199. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 200. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 531–32 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
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 203. See Carpenter, 137 S. Ct. at 2220. 
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modern society.204  Indeed, many bioethicists have specifically criticized 
DTC providers for propagating the notion that the “democratization” of 
genetics is key to “self-actualization” in order to further their economic aims 
of biobanking genetic information.205  Moreover, the bioethicist Dr. Sandra 
Soo-Jin Lee, in conducting a study of eighty individuals who had undergone 
genetic testing via 23andMe, found that information regarding medical 
propensities revealed by genetic tests had little impact on their medical 
decisions and lifestyle choices.206 
Although Dr. Lee’s study is more anecdotal than comprehensive, it 
strongly supports the notion that acquiring one’s genetic information from a 
DTC provider is not fundamental to identity formation or social relationships 
in the modern age.  In addition, even if genetic tests are construed as a social 
or personal necessity, there are clinical genetic tests performed by physicians 
that provide comprehensive screening and are subject to more stringent 
privacy rules.207  Consumers may seek out such clinical tests (albeit at a 
higher cost) if they are uncomfortable with DTC providers’ privacy terms.  
Thus, unlike an individual transacting with a cell phone provider, voluntary 
assumption of risk of exposure to law enforcement through transacting in 
genetic data with a DTC provider could be presumed in this context. 
2.  Carpenter’s Consideration of Depth and Comprehensive Reach 
of DTC Genetic Databases Is Immaterial 
Warrantless searches of DTC genetic testing databases by law enforcement 
may be justifiable under the third-party doctrine on the basis of assumption 
of risk alone.  Nonetheless, compelling arguments would have to be 
presented as to why, pursuant to Carpenter, genetic information is not subject 
to constitutional protections given its depth and comprehensive reach. 
There is, however, a considerable body of jurisprudence that supports the 
notion that there should not be an exception for genetic information that is 
validly subject to a warrantless search under the third-party doctrine and the 
Fourth Amendment.208  In addition, Justice Gorsuch has asserted that 
balancing the abstract “value of privacy in a particular setting” with 
“society’s interest in combating crime” is a policy inquiry best left to an 
elected legislature to decide.209  The following sections evaluate Carpenter’s 
consideration of depth and comprehensive reach as applied to disclosed 
genetic information through the lens of these criticisms. 
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a.  Depth of Information 
As stated above, the “depth” prong under Carpenter considers whether the 
nature of the disclosed information is “deeply revealing” and, accordingly, 
protected as “private” under the Constitution.210   
The nature of genetic information is such that it has the ability to reveal a 
wide scope of information about a consumer’s ethnicity, medical 
background, and familial relationships.211  However, DNA samples legally 
acquired by the police as part of routine investigations likewise can reveal 
intimate information of this nature.212  Nonetheless, as of yet, the judiciary 
has not considered such DNA samples to be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment merely by virtue of their potential to disclose “private” 
information beyond what is needed for identification of a suspect. 
In California v. Greenwood,213 the Court held that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in property abandoned in a public space 
that is accessible to law enforcement.214  Pursuant to Greenwood, several 
state courts have held that where an individual voluntarily “abandons” a 
biological sample containing DNA in a public place, he or she can claim no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the biological sample.215  As the 
Washington Supreme Court explicitly stated in State v. Athan,216 “There is 
no subjective expectation of privacy in discarded genetic material.”217  
Rather, if a DNA sample is abandoned or “knowingly exposed” to public 
view, the Fourth Amendment does not protect that sample from search or 
seizure by law enforcement.218  Similarly, if the Informant knowingly 
assumes the risk of exposure of his or her genetic information to law 
enforcement, this act is, arguably, functionally equivalent to abandoning that 
genetic information in a public space accessible to law enforcement.  
Accordingly, Greenwood and its state law progeny suggest that genetic 
information disclosed to third-party DTC providers may not be entitled to 
any special constitutional protections as “genetic material.” 
In addition, it is highly unlikely that law enforcement would retain and 
misuse such genetic material given the purpose of genetic searches by law 
enforcement and potential legislative constraints on abuse.  First, the Court 
has held that collected DNA samples that may reveal intimate information 
are not inherently entitled to Fourth Amendment protections because law 
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2568 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
enforcement merely tests the sample for the thirteen loci that are relevant to 
identification.219  As the Third Circuit held in United States v. Mitchell,220 
the fear of “hypothetical abuse”221 by law enforcement of the “sensitive 
information that can be mined from a person’s DNA” should not exclusively 
govern the analysis of whether the information is protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.222  Instead, particularly where there are legislative constraints 
preventing abusive use of DNA samples, law enforcement’s legitimate 
interest in using DNA to identify suspects in crimes should be accorded equal 
weight in the analysis.223 
Similarly, law enforcement requests for genetic information from DTC 
providers would likely be limited to information which is necessary for 
identification of the putative suspect:  the names of the familial matches to 
the suspect genetic profile.224  There are no state or federal statutes explicitly 
regulating the use of genetic information obtained in the course of an 
investigation.225  Nonetheless, a patchwork of private and legislative 
solutions could likely prevent either access to more sensitive genetic 
information or potential abuse of such information should law enforcement 
be granted access. 
DTC providers likely would resist releasing more sensitive genetic 
information from their databases to law enforcement because doing so would 
jeopardize consumer trust in their services.226  Indeed, Ancestry’s resistance 
to disclosing the genetic information of one of its users in 2014 serves as 
powerful anecdotal evidence of how a DTC provider would likely react to a 
subpoena for genetic information.227  There, Ancestry refused to even 
provide law enforcement with the name of an individual whose genetic 
information was stored within its databases until it was compelled to do so 
by court order.228 
Third-party providers like Ancestry and 23andMe may, in fact, be well-
positioned to resist and narrow law enforcement requests for information in 
court.229  Even if third-party providers have no meaningful grounds to reject 
a government subpoena pursuant the third-party doctrine, such providers 
have, on occasion, successfully obtained court orders limiting the scope of 
information required by the subpoena in order to protect the privacy interests 
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of their consumers.230  Therefore, DTC providers are strongly incentivized, 
and likely have sufficient legal grounds, to petition courts to narrow law 
enforcement requests for sensitive genetic information to, at most, disclosure 
of the names of potential Informants. 
Legislative efforts like HIPAA and GINA also suggest that the federal 
legislature is finely attuned to the risks of abusive uses of genetic 
information.231  Even if there are not existing restrictions on law enforcement 
requests for genetic information stored by DTC providers,232 these legislative 
efforts suggest that Congress is capable of and willing to act if any abusive 
uses of genetic information by law enforcement were to come to light. 
Finally, investigations of genetic databases have measurable benefits to 
law enforcement and society at large.  From the perspective of corrective 
justice, identifying perpetrators of crimes allows for punishment of the 
wrongdoer and “provides peace and resolution to the victims and their 
families.”233  In addition, such investigations allow law enforcement to 
identify suspects in particularly heinous or violent unsolved crimes for the 
benefit of public safety, which, in turn, reinforces public trust in the criminal 
justice system.234  The judiciary, therefore, might be hesitant to preemptively 
limit this beneficial law enforcement practice when the risk of excessive 
surveillance of genetic material is merely speculative in nature and may not 
materialize. 
b.  Comprehensive Reach 
The reach of DTC genetic databases is undoubtedly extensive, as the 
genetic material of over fifteen million consumers is housed in these 
databases.235  Furthermore, the genetic material of those fifteen million 
individuals has the potential to implicate tens of millions of additional 
individuals who share genetic material with the databased individuals.236  
Pursuant to Carpenter, allowing law enforcement to conduct investigations 
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of the genetic material of millions of individuals without individualized 
suspicion might constitute prohibited “suspicionless searches” under the 
Fourth Amendment.237 
Notably, however, CODIS is similar in scope, as it has approximately 
seventeen million offender profiles within its databases.238  The 
comprehensive breadth of CODIS is justified on the grounds that arrestees 
and felons have diminished expectations of privacy as a result of their 
criminal history and because there is a measurable possibility that arrestees 
and felons will reoffend.239  Nonetheless, the law enforcement practice of 
identifying suspects in CODIS through partial matches to offender profiles 
or familial searches similarly implicates a much wider web of presumably 
“innocent” individuals who maintain reasonable expectations of privacy.240  
In the absence of uniform agreement among state legislatures about the 
permissibility of long-range familial searches,241 it may not be appropriate 
for the judiciary to issue broad, sweeping policy judgments as to whether 
such searches on DTC genetic databases implicate too many individuals or 
risk suspicionless searches.242 
Indeed, many individuals likely support law enforcement’s use of DTC 
genetic databases to solve cold cases.  In a recent survey by four scholars at 
the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of 
Medicine that was circulated to 1587 individuals, 79 percent of respondents 
“supported police searches of genetic websites that identify genetic 
relatives,” and 62 percent of respondents supported the “disclosure of DTC 
genetic testing customer information to police” as a means of identifying 
suspects in violent crimes.243 
Furthermore, the use of DTC genetic databases as a means of identifying 
suspects may balance some of the extreme racial disparities present in the 
criminal justice system and CODIS.244  People of color likely have 
disproportionate representation in CODIS as a result of inherent racial biases 
in arrests and sentencing in the criminal justice system.245  By contrast, DTC 
providers’ databases are disproportionality skewed toward white individuals 
of European descent.246  Consequently, permitting law enforcement’s 
investigation of DTC genetic databases to identify suspects may “begin to 
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redress, in at least in one respect, disparities in the criminal justice 
system.”247 
Given these countervailing policy interests, it may be more prudent to 
allow elected state or federal legislatures to gauge public interest regarding 
the comprehensive reach afforded by law enforcement conducting long-
range familial searches on DTC genetic databases and, if necessary, enact 
statutes limiting this reach.248 
3.  Third-Party DTC Providers Maintain Proprietary Interests 
in Stored Genetic Information 
Finally, law enforcement searches of DTC genetic databases may be 
justified on the grounds that the Informant maintains no reasonable 
expectation of privacy based on proprietary interests in the genetic 
information.  Under this perspective, the Informant relinquishes her 
proprietary interests in the genetic information by granting the DTC provider 
possession and use of her biological sample and genetic information. 
Although the privacy policies of DTC providers like 23andMe and 
Ancestry claim in their terms of use and privacy policies that Informants 
maintain “ownership” over their genetic information,249 these statements 
may be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.  Because the DTC 
providers typically reserve an exclusive license to use and distribute their 
consumers’ genetic information in their terms of service, many reporters and 
legal experts have suggested that ownership rights in the genetic information 
are granted to DTC providers by consumers in spite of this purported waiver 
of such rights.250 
A license, traditionally construed, functions merely as a permissive 
contract to use another’s property for a particular purpose.251  However, a 
more modern conception of licensing and its function in modern transactions 
suggests that exclusive licenses may, in effect, transfer certain divisible 
property rights in information and therefore serve “the same commercial 
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purpose as an assignment.”252  Likewise, in the realm of patent law, where a 
purported license transfers “substantially all” of the licensors rights to use 
and sell patented inventions, courts have considered the transfer an 
assignment.253 
Under copyright law, the prevailing view suggests that an exclusive license 
to use a party’s information does not effectuate a transfer of copyright 
ownership under the Copyright Act of 1976.254  Nevertheless, there is a 
countervailing minority view that an exclusive license “constitutes a transfer 
of copyright ownership” in information under the Copyright Act.255  
Furthermore, where a party grants itself “sublicensing” rights as part of the 
“licensing” agreements, some courts have treated the agreement as an 
assignment under the Copyright Act.256 
Thus, although 23andMe and Ancestry allege that their interest in 
consumers’ genetic information is only a “license” to use such information, 
a comprehensive investigation of the rights associated with those licenses 
might support notion that they are, in practice, an assignment of property 
rights.  The licenses grant the companies expansive permission to use their 
consumers’ genetic information, as well as the capacity to sublicense the 
information without the explicit permission of the consumer.257  Moreover, 
23andMe grants itself an “irrevocable” exclusive license—a license which 
one scholar has argued is better construed as a “deed” conveying an 
ownership interest.258 
The nature of these licenses undercuts the DTC providers’ claims that no 
proprietary rights in genetic information are transferred from the Informant.  
Justice Kennedy suggested that a proprietary interest in information is 
transferred to the third party where the Informant fails to maintain possession 
of or use the information as a result of the transaction.259  The granted 
licenses, therefore, could support the argument that such a proprietary 
interest is conveyed and that transacting in genetic information with DTC 
providers should not be understood as merely a “bailment” of property to the 
third-party genetic testing provider. 
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In addition, Jorge Contreras, an expert in intellectual property law and 
human genetics, has presented strong policy arguments against exclusively 
vesting property rights to genetic information in those to whom the genetic 
material belongs.260  Professor Contreras asserts that granting “property-like 
rights” to research participants in their transferred genetic material, and any 
inventions derived from that material, risks “creat[ing] an anticommons of 
significant proportions” that would stymy important biomedical research on 
the human genome.261  Similarly, requiring “propertized consent” for the use 
of genetic information from potentially “millions” of individuals is not 
feasible in practice and would likewise hinder important genetic research.262  
Indeed, courts have been reluctant to allow individuals to claim property 
rights in patented scientific inventions derived from their cells.263 
In sum, under this perspective, the judiciary should not declare that:  
(1) the Informant maintains an unconditional property interest in their genetic 
information despite the “license” agreement; or (2) that “generational 
consent” from the Collective is necessary to transfer property rights in 
genetic material to the third-party DTC provider because of the dramatic 
ramifications such a holding might have on the field of biomedical research. 
C.  The Third-Party Doctrine as Inapplicable to Genetic Information:  
Protection of Consumers’ Genetic Information 
Opponents of warrantless law enforcement searches of DTC providers’ 
databases would, by contrast, assert that the third-party doctrine does not 
apply because genetic information is entitled to special protections under the 
Fourth Amendment and the broader confines of the Constitution. 
While the assumption-of-risk theory underlying the third-party doctrine 
could be inapplicable in the context of transacting with a DTC provider, the 
comprehensive reach and breadth of genetic information stored by DTC 
providers may justify its exclusion from the third-party doctrine pursuant to 
Carpenter.  Alternatively, some might argue that Informants maintain a 
proprietary interest in their genetic information despite disclosure to a third-
party provider. 
1.  No Voluntary Assumption of Risk by Consumers 
The premise that individuals “voluntarily” assume the risk of the exposure 
to law enforcement under the third-party doctrine may be compromised by a 
probable lack of understanding concerning this risk.  As Justice Thurgood 
Marshall argued in his dissent in Smith, “[p]rivacy is not a discrete 
commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all,” and often when “we disclose 
certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose [we 
do not] assume that this information will be released to other persons for 
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other purposes.”264  Therefore, voluntary assumption of risk perhaps cannot 
be presumed where a consumer reasonably believes that the third-party 
business has exclusive access to his or her information and will use it for a 
limited business purpose.265 
Indeed, it is not clear that the Informant, in disclosing his or her genetic 
information to a DTC provider, understands the attendant risks that law 
enforcement can (1) identify a relative as a suspect using that information; 
and (2) potentially store the Informant’s unique genetic information derived 
from an investigation for an indefinite amount of time for alternative uses.266  
The Informant likely does not understand this risk because the terms of use 
and privacy policies of DTC providers imply that his or her data is subject to 
a high degree of confidentiality.267  DTC providers’ terms suggest that a 
consumer’s genetic information will not be shared with any external parties 
without the informed consent of that consumer.268  Furthermore, even where 
the genetic information is shared with partners of the DTC provider, the 
providers state that data will be anonymized.269  It is therefore unlikely that 
the Informant voluntarily consents to the implicit risk that the DTC provider, 
or one of its labs, research partners, or business partners, may subsequently 
hand over the Informant’s genetic information to law enforcement. 
In addition, the claim that the Informant explicitly assumes the risk posed 
by law enforcement investigations by consenting to the terms of use and 
privacy policies that acknowledge this risk likely misconstrues consumers’ 
interactions with these contracts of adhesion.  The Second Circuit has held 
that the “[c]larity and conspicuousness of . . . terms are important in securing 
informed assent.”270  Even where the consumer is provided with notice of 
terms and asked to agree to them, if the terms are then buried within a linked, 
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long, scrollable document which does not call attention to the provision at 
issue, informed assent may not be presumed.271 
The provisions regarding law enforcement access to consumers’ genetic 
information may be construed as “buried” within DTC provider’s privacy 
policies and terms of use.  For example, between 23andMe’s privacy policy, 
terms of use, and informed-consent form, a consumer likely has to read 
through over fifty pages of documents to understand the full scope of his or 
her privacy rights.272  The consent to law enforcement access in the terms of 
service is nestled in a long paragraph approximately ten pages into the 
document.273  In the privacy statement, the reader must wade through 
approximately sixteen pages of documents to find the provision giving notice 
of potential disclosure of genetic information to law enforcement.274  As the 
bioethicist Kayte Spector-Bagdady has noted, “[t]ransparency . . . is not the 
same thing as informed consent” when it comes to DTC provider’s privacy 
policies and terms of use.275  Because the provisions concerning law 
enforcement access are not obvious to an Informant faced with reading 
expansive privacy policies and terms of use, consent to, and thereby 
voluntary assumption of, the risk on the part of the Informant may not be 
established. 
Moreover, regardless of the Informant’s voluntary assumption of risk, the 
Target certainly has not similarly assumed the risk of exposure of his or her 
shared genetic material to law enforcement.  Genetic information implicates 
a wide scope of related family members with overlapping genetic material.  
Thus, when the Informant discloses genetic information to a third party, the 
Informant has also, in effect, disclosed the genetic information of a number 
of relatives.  The Target, however, likely has no idea that portions of his or 
her genetic code are held by a third-party provider or that this could 
ultimately lead to his or her arrest for a crime.276  Indeed, for this reason, 
some medical ethicists have suggested that “generational consent” between 
all relatives who might be implicated by genetic information stored in DTC 
genetic databases should be required before disclosure.277  Accordingly, 
there are strong arguments that the Target should likewise have voluntarily 
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assumed the risk under the third-party doctrine when it comes to shared 
genetic information. 
2.  Carpenter Justifies Excluding DTC Genetic Databases 
from the Third-Party Doctrine 
Opponents of warrantless law enforcement searches of DTC genetic 
databases could argue that the depth and comprehensive reach of the genetic 
information available in DTC genetic databases weigh against the application 
of the third-party doctrine pursuant to Carpenter.  This section discusses the 
specific privacy risks associated with the depth and comprehensive reach of 
private genetic databases in greater detail. 
a.  Depth of Information 
Genetic information provides an exceptionally intimate window into the 
Informant’s personhood, medical health, and familial relationships.278  At 
first blush, jurisprudence concerning samples of DNA that are abandoned in 
public or housed in CODIS’s databases might suggest that, despite its 
exceptional qualities, genetic information does not merit special privacy 
protections where it is validly obtained for a limited purpose.279  However, 
upon a more exacting inquiry, searching for genetic information on DTC 
genetic databases may, in fact, be factually distinct from collecting 
abandoned DNA or testing a DNA sample in CODIS. 
Although the DNA abandonment cases strongly suggest that there are no 
special privacy protections afforded to individuals whose DNA is validly 
acquired by the police,280 drawing an analogy between the abandonment of 
DNA and entrustment of genetic information to a third party is likely 
unwarranted.  Discarding a cigarette, cup, or other object that contains an 
individual’s DNA constitutes a total, voluntary abandonment of expectations 
of privacy in that object and, by extension, the DNA sample left on that 
object.281  These instances stand in stark contrast to entrusting one’s genetic 
information to a DTC provider who promises to keep it private.282  When an 
individual entrusts information to a third party in this capacity, his or her 
expectation of privacy in the information is merely diminished or reduced.283  
As the Court held in Carpenter, where privacy interests are merely reduced, 
a more comprehensive analysis of the nature of the privacy interest in the 
information is appropriate for the Fourth Amendment search analysis.284 
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In Maryland v. King,285 the Court specified that entering the STR testing 
of DNA samples into CODIS did not implicate the privacy interests of the 
tested individual because STR loci “do not reveal . . . genetic traits.”286  As 
Erin Murphy, an expert in forensic DNA typing, has stated, King therefore 
makes clear that “unfettered access to the entire genome of an individual 
should not be presumed from the cases approving forensic databasing.”287  
The Court in King failed to elaborate upon why “genetic traits” would trigger 
more extensive privacy interests; however, other legal scholarship and cases 
elaborate upon this point. 
First, genetic information provided to DTC providers may reveal the 
Informant’s genetic propensity for certain medical conditions or diseases.288  
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,289 the Court held that testing 
urine could reveal “private medical facts” and therefore constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, even though urine testing does not involve a 
bodily intrusion.290  This holding implies that individuals maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their medical history and other 
private medical information.291 
Second, genetic information given to DTC providers reveals detailed 
information about the Informant’s familial ties, thereby implicating his or her 
familial privacy.  The results provided to law enforcement from a search of 
a suspect’s profile in DTC providers’ databases likely include a long list of 
related individuals who have submitted their genetic information to the 
provider for testing.292  Law enforcement, in the course of building family 
trees and investigating potential suspects, may inadvertently reveal unknown 
familial relationships.293  This may impact both the Informant’s intimate 
conceptions of his familial identity and the familial identity of the 
Collective.294  Carpenter clearly indicates that individuals maintain a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in familial associations under the Fourth 
Amendment.295  Furthermore, there is a long constitutional history of 
protecting familial decision-making and integrity from government 
surveillance or intrusion.296  There are, therefore, strong privacy interests in 
both the medical and familial information revealed by genetic testing, which 
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suggest that law enforcement’s unfettered access to this information under 
the third-party doctrine would be inappropriate. 
However, as is the case with testing DNA samples and entering them into 
CODIS, law enforcement’s interest in genetic information disclosed to DTC 
providers is limited to its ability to identify a suspect.  King and Mitchell lend 
support to the understanding that the risks of law enforcement requesting a 
broader scope of more intimate genetic information from DTC genetic 
databases are unlikely to come to fruition and do not justify excluding genetic 
information from valid law enforcement investigation.297  However, both of 
these holdings were issued in the face of preexisting legislative restrictions 
limiting the use of genetic information in DNA databases.  In Mitchell, the 
Third Circuit held that the possibility of abuse of private information derived 
from DNA was negligible because federal law298 imposes criminal penalties 
for misuse of biological samples or DNA results obtained from samples in 
CODIS.299  Similarly, in King, the Court noted that the risk that an 
individual’s expectation of privacy in their genetic traits would be invaded 
were minimal because a Maryland statute provided that only DNA records 
that “directly relate to the identification of individuals [could] be collected 
and stored” in the state’s DNA database.300 
By contrast, there are no explicit legislative constraints on either the depth 
of genetic information that law enforcement can collect from DTC genetic 
databases or law enforcement’s retention and future use of such genetic 
information.301  The possibility that the legislature would be able to react in 
a timely fashion if law enforcement began collecting and misusing sensitive 
genetic information is a thin reed on which to rest.  In addition, relying on 
DTC providers to regulate law enforcement requests is not a foolproof 
protection.302  As Daniel Solove has pointed out, third-party providers are 
often inclined to disclose consumer information to law enforcement “in times 
of crisis or when serious crimes are at issue.”303 
Without meaningful restrictions on law enforcement’s retention and use of 
genetic information obtained from DTC genetic databases, there is a sizable 
risk of abuse of that information.  Historically, where the government has 
been granted access to certain forms of information with limited regulatory 
oversight, it has used that information for purposes beyond its intended 
scope.304  In collecting data from third-party businesses, law enforcement 
officers typically cannot pinpoint in advance what particular information 
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contained within that data is directly relevant to its criminal investigations.305  
Information requests for third-party data by law enforcement are 
consequently relatively broad in scope and inevitably sweep up intimate 
details beyond the information specifically needed to identify the suspect in 
a particular crime.306  Without clear regulations or policies on retention or 
use of individuals’ intimate information, the government and law 
enforcement could later use that information to target political 
undesirables.307  While the possibility of such misuse may seem remote, at 
various points throughout the latter half of the of twentieth century, the FBI, 
the CIA, Congress, and the U.S. Army have collected intimate information 
from U.S. citizens for the purposes of identifying and monitoring political 
dissidents.308 
If law enforcement and the government begin to build their own genetic 
database using information gleaned from DTC genetic databases, the risks of 
misuse associated with such data are troubling.309  Specifically, such a 
database would increase the possibility of the resurgence of state-sponsored 
genetic discrimination.310  The potential for genetic discrimination based on 
genetic medical propensities has, to some extent, been capped by GINA.311  
However, the ethnographic and behavioral genetic traits revealed by DTC 
genetic tests could certainly be misused in a discriminatory fashion.  For 
example, scientists have recently identified an alarming trend of white 
nationalists linking academic papers on genetic propensities among certain 
ethnographic groups with ill-informed claims of white supremacy.312  While 
perhaps there are sufficient legal and political safeguards to prevent state-
sponsored racial genetic discrimination of the kind advocated for by white 
supremacists, these circumstances suggest that the belief that behavioral 
genetic traits are indicative of actual human behavior remains powerful in 
contemporary society. 
Indeed, as recently as the 1990s, scientists have attempted to discover a 
“crime gene” that could justify surveillance or control of individuals deemed 
to be “genetically predisposed to criminality.”313  Erin Murphy has warned 
that these attempts to identify genetic indicia of criminality could be renewed 
and expanded for use in the criminal justice system as certain behavioral and 
cognitive traits could be linked to deviant or violent behavior.314  Murphy 
asserts that the criminal justice system could easily slot studies on genetic 
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predispositions into, for example, the surveys that evaluate a criminal’s 
likelihood of recidivism based on social and economic factors.315 
The potential that “genetic predeterminism” could justify greater 
surveillance of particular individuals therefore may warrant protecting 
genetic information from unregulated access by law enforcement.316  
Furthermore, it is clear that genetic information can reveal constitutionally 
protected private information.  Accordingly, the depth of information 
available in DTC genetic databases provides a strong basis for the argument 
that the third-party doctrine does not apply and any investigations of such 
databases must comply with the Fourth Amendment. 
b.  Comprehensive Reach of DTC Genetic Databases 
In addition, the comprehensive breadth of DTC genetic databases could 
suggest that law enforcement should not be entitled to conduct suspicionless 
searches of those databases.317  While DTC genetic databases are currently 
similar in breadth to CODIS, the size of CODIS is premised on a “legitimate 
government interest” in monitoring arrestees and convicts.318  Specifically, 
the inclusion of millions of arrestees and convicts in a national DNA database 
has been justified on the grounds that there is a quantifiable possibility that 
arrestees and convicts will reoffend.319  Furthermore, the government interest 
is deemed more weighty than the privacy interests of arrestees and convicts 
because a convicted felon or arrestee has diminished expectations of 
privacy.320  Indeed, the Court in King took pains to distinguish searches on 
CODIS from “programmatic searches of . . . the public at large,” which are 
prohibited in the “absence of individualized suspicion.”321 
Law enforcement officials could attempt to frame programmatic searches 
of DTC genetic databases as a “legitimate government interest” because they 
help to identify suspects in sexual or violent crimes.322  Regardless, it is 
difficult to imagine that a court would find a search of a database of over 
fifteen million citizens justifiable on the grounds that millions of individuals 
vacated any reasonable expectation of privacy by deciding to take a fifty 
dollar genetic test to find out whether they have ancestors from unexpected 
locations or a genetic predisposition to disliking the taste of broccoli. 
Moreover, searches of DTC genetic databases implicate the genetic 
material of a comprehensive net of individuals beyond those consumers 
whose profiles are explicitly within the database.  Indeed, the aforementioned 
study of long-range familial searches conducted on DTC genetic databases 
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estimated that only 2 percent of a target population would need to be on a 
DTC genetic database to find a third cousin or closer match to a suspect 
profile.323  Assuming that the vast majority of individuals submitting their 
genetic information are U.S. citizens, approximately 4 to 5 percent of the 
U.S. population have disclosed their genetic information to DTC 
providers.324  It is thus likely that DTC providers could implicate a majority 
of citizens within the United States.  State legislatures and the FBI have either 
prohibited or imposed meaningful limits on the capacity of law enforcement 
to conduct similar programmatic searches for a family member of a suspect 
DNA profile on CODIS.325  Although the consensus on what constitutes an 
appropriate familial search is not uniform, these limitations strongly suggest 
that the public is not comfortable with searches of innocent civilians by virtue 
of their familial relationship to a suspect. 
Finally, while it is easier to justify law enforcement’s need for an 
expansive database of genetic data to solve violent or sexual crimes, there is 
a serious risk that, without appropriate regulations, such databases could 
eventually be used by law enforcement to solve less serious crimes.326  The 
vast expansion of qualifying crimes for inclusion in CODIS in the past two 
decades supports the probability that this will occur.327 
Therefore, DTC genetic databases collectively may be construed as a 
universal database with an extremely comprehensive reach that, without 
regulation, would allow law enforcement to find suspects in any crime where 
a DNA sample was left behind.  Arguably, a search of such databases is the 
quintessential search of millions of public citizens without individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing that the Fourth Amendment is specifically designed 
to guard against.328  As such, the comprehensive reach of DTC genetic 
databases strongly supports excluding warrantless searches of such databases 
from the third-party doctrine. 
3.  Ownership of Genetic Information Is Not Vested 
in Third-Party DTC Providers 
Finally, opponents of warrantless searches of DTC genetic databases 
would likely maintain that the Informant reserves full proprietary interests in 
genetic information disclosed to a third-party DTC provider.  The Informant 
could allege a subjective expectation of privacy in his or her genetic 
information given that the privacy policies and terms of use of DTC providers 
expressly state that they do not take ownership in their users’ genetic 
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information.329  However, the opponent would have to prove that the 
Informant’s subjective expectations of proprietary interests in the 
information are objectively reasonable in light of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections of property, the terms of the transaction with the third-party DTC 
providers, and relevant positive law. 
From the outset, opponents could likely argue that the Informant has a 
special proprietary interest in information directly pertaining to his or her 
“person” and therefore maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
genetic information.  The plain text of the Fourth Amendment specifically 
protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons.”330  In Kyllo v. 
United States,331 the Court determined that intimate details from within the 
home were private and reasoned that the Fourth Amendment, at a minimum, 
protects privacy interests associated with an individual’s “house.”332  
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment may be construed as inherently protecting 
privacy that implicates one’s body and personhood.333 
As Sonia Suter has asserted, “Genetic information is central to th[e] 
development of identity and conceptualization of [the] self.”334  As a result, 
individuals likely maintain a right to “control the disclosure of personal facts” 
associated with their unique genetic material.335  Therefore, even where the 
“exclusive license” granted to the DTC provider purports to transfer control 
and use of the Informant’s genetic information, the individual nonetheless 
retains ultimate control of that information because it is his or her private 
property. 
In addition, the notion that the “license” granted to DTC providers does 
not constitute a transfer of ownership and control is supported by case law 
concerning the patentability of DNA segments.  In Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,336 the Court firmly asserted that 
“naturally occurring” isolated DNA segments are not patentable and 
therefore are not subject to ownership by a third party.337  Applying this 
holding to genetic information would suggest that third-party DTC providers 
are not entitled to claim ownership or exclusive use over the Informant’s 
genetic information. 
Alternatively, Natalie Ram, a leading legal scholar on the constitutionality 
of DNA searches, has suggested that genetic information is best understood 
as being held by an individual as a tenancy by the entirety with all other 
individuals who share that genetic information.338  From this perspective, the 
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individual disclosing data to a third-party DTC provider cannot vest property 
rights in the provider because “a key feature of tenancy by the entirety is that 
typically ‘[n]either spouse may unilaterally alienate or encumber the 
property.’”339  Ram’s formulation thus recognizes the shared proprietary 
interests of the Informant, Target, and Collective in genetic material and each 
party’s associated privacy interests in that material.340  Pursuant to Ram’s 
perspective, generational consent would likewise have to be granted by the 
Collective in order for the Informant to convey property interests in his or 
her genetic material.341 
Finally, a handful of states have enacted legislation specifying ownership 
rights over the human genome.342  These states, which include Alaska, 
Colorado, Florida, and Georgia, declare that genetic information is the 
exclusive property of the individual to whom the information belongs.343  
Although state law is by no means conclusive on this matter, it suggests that 
there is reasonable public support for the understanding that individuals 
maintain a property interest in their genetic information. 
Concepts of property law as applied to genetic information therefore can 
bolster arguments that the Informant retains a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his or her genetic information because the Informant’s proprietary 
interest in that data is not conveyed to the DTC provider.  On these grounds, 
the third-party doctrine should not apply to genetic information because 
genetic information is protected under the Fourth Amendment as private 
information associated with protected proprietary interests.  In addition, 
pursuant to Justice Gorsuch’s assertions in Carpenter, a third-party DTC 
provider functions as a bailee and may refuse to turn over a consumer’s 
genetic information.344 
IV.  SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHT TO GENETIC PRIVACY 
The lack of regulatory or legislative oversight of DTC providers and law 
enforcement’s potential ability to perform warrantless searches of their 
databases is extremely troublesome in light of individuals’ privacy interests 
in their intimate genetic information.  Senator Chuck Schumer called for 
greater regulation of DTC providers and their capacity to share consumers’ 
genetic information in December 2017.345  However, no other legislators 
 
 339. Id. at 912 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 282 
(2002)). 
 340. Id. at 898–903. 
 341. See supra note 277 and accompanying text; see also Ram, supra note 76, at 913. 
 342. Ram, supra note 76, at 894; see also Genome Statute and Legislation Database 
Search, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/policyethics/legdatabase/ 
pubsearchresult.cfm?content_type_id=1&topic=4&topic_id=1&source_id=1&keyword=&se
arch=Search [https://perma.cc/N3F4-WBMD] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 343. SHELDON KRIMSKY & DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, 
ANCESTRY DNA TESTING AND PRIVACY:  A CONSUMER GUIDE 31 (2017), 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/img/Ancestry-DNA-Testing-and-Privacy-
Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8HY-3KMF]. 
 344. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 345. See Schulson, supra note 275. 
2584 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
have expressed similar sentiments or made efforts to either encourage greater 
oversight by federal regulators, like the Federal Trade Commission, or 
expand HIPAA’s protections to DTC providers despite extensive media 
coverage of DTC providers and their privacy policies in the past year.346  It 
is thus likely that the burden will ultimately fall to the judiciary to take an 
active role in protecting privacy interests in genetic information in the context 
of law enforcement searches of DTC genetic databases. 
Genetic testing reveals fundamentally intimate information about an 
individual that should be protected by the Fourth Amendment—law 
enforcement officers seeking this information should be required to obtain a 
warrant supported by probable cause.347  Part IV.A asserts that judicial 
intervention to protect the privacy interests of consumers in genetic 
information would be appropriate in light of current legislative inaction.  Part 
IV.B contends that Carpenter’s protections of privacy interests in intimate 
information disclosed to a third party undoubtedly justifies excluding genetic 
information from the third-party doctrine under the Fourth Amendment.  Part 
IV.C then describes why Carpenter’s approach to the third-party doctrine is 
preferable to the property-based approach advocated by Justice Kennedy and 
Justice Gorsuch given the scientific benefits of permitting third-party 
ownership of genetic information. 
A.  The Benefits of Judicial Intervention as Opposed 
to Legislative or Private Solutions 
It is emphatically the judiciary’s role to analyze the Constitution and 
protect fundamental privacy interests.348  As Justice Harlan has stated, “[T]he 
burden of guarding privacy in a free society should not be on its citizens.”349  
Indeed, the presumption that there will be sufficient public demand to 
stimulate significant legislative action if individuals are dissatisfied with law 
enforcement’s access to private DTC genetic databases is probably 
unsound.350  Typically, consumers are not proactive about protecting their 
privacy interests in information disclosed to third-party providers.351  For 
example, the survey conducted to gauge public opinion regarding law 
enforcement searches of DTC genetic databases solicited participants’ 
opinions on Carpenter for the purpose of comparison.352  The study found 
“exactly the same pattern of strong support for police access to cell phone 
records and social media accounts except when the purpose is to identify 
perpetrators of nonviolent crimes.”353  It is therefore unlikely that consumers 
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take care to fully educate themselves regarding privacy risks associated with 
unrestrained searches of their private genetic information by law 
enforcement or that they take preemptive steps to prohibit such searches. 
In the absence of legislative regulation of the disclosure of intimate genetic 
information, the burden shifts to the DTC providers to regulate such 
disclosures.354  Even if we assume that these DTC providers will actually 
resist such legal requests, it will be difficult for them to do so without a legal 
determination that the third-party doctrine does not apply.355  The DTC 
provider could attempt to narrow a law enforcement subpoena on the grounds 
of “unreasonable burden,” as Google did in California; however, other 
jurisdictions have not found this legal argument persuasive.356  If the DTC 
provider cannot narrow the subpoena, DTC providers would not have 
grounds to assert Fourth Amendment protection of such information because 
of the third-party doctrine.357  Exclusion of genetic information from the 
third-party doctrine consequently may be necessary in order to allow DTC 
providers to effectively resist such requests and require a warrant supported 
by probable cause. 
B.  Extending Carpenter’s Protections to Genetic Information Held 
by Third-Party DTC Providers 
To be clear, in Carpenter, the Court asserted that its decision was a 
“narrow one” that did not “disturb the application of Smith [or] Miller.”358  
However, Carpenter’s in-depth consideration of the ways in which 
individuals casually, and often inadvertently, trade in private and intimate 
information with third-party providers nonetheless profoundly changes the 
application of the third-party doctrine analysis.359  Proof of disclosure to the 
third-party business has become only the first step in analyzing reasonable 
expectations of privacy under the third-party doctrine.360  In Carpenter, the 
Court effectively called for a more in-depth analysis of the premise of 
assumption of risk and a consideration of more abstract conceptions of 
privacy that are subject to protection under the Constitution.361  A searching 
analysis of this nature of the disclosure of genetic information to DTC 
providers clearly calls for “genetic exceptionalism” in the context of the 
third-party doctrine.362 
Genetic information is inseverable from one’s individual identity and 
reveals deeply personal and sensitive information regarding individuals and 
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their family members.363  Trading in this confidential information with DTC 
providers has nonetheless become a relatively casual process in the past three 
years.  Such tests can be easily obtained from drugstores, Amazon, and the 
providers’ websites for a reasonable cost.  The decision to disclose this 
intimate information to a trusted DTC provider is often guided by a strong 
desire to learn more about one’s identity and prepare for potential medical 
risks through the genetic test.364  The perspective that disclosing this 
information to a DTC provider is functionally equivalent to abandoning one’s 
DNA in public therefore seems deeply at odds with the purpose of such 
disclosure by consumers.365 
Furthermore, DTC providers, to some extent, mislead consumers as to 
their capacity to protect consumers’ confidential genetic information from 
access by law enforcement and deanonymization by other parties.366  These 
providers indicate that they will actively prevent law enforcement from 
accessing genetic information while simultaneously reserving their right to 
do so deep within their terms of use and privacy policies.367  Consequently, 
the presumption that consumers assume the risk of law enforcement access 
within this context may be unwarranted given the purpose of disclosure and 
probable lack of understanding of the depth of this risk.368 
If consumers have not assumed the risk of disclosure of their genetic 
information, the intimate content of such information clearly warrants 
protection under the Constitution.369  Genetic information stored in DTC 
genetic databases reveals far more detailed information than the DNA 
information stored in CODIS that is used for identification of suspects.370  
There are no current legislative constraints on the scope of genetic 
information that law enforcement may request from a DTC provider, and thus 
there is no guarantee they would seek the minimum amount of information 
needed to identify a suspect.371 
The medical and familial information revealed by genetic material 
undoubtedly falls within the bounds of privacy interests traditionally 
safeguarded under the Constitution.372  To allow the state to collect and 
indefinitely retain information concerning medical propensities and familial 
relationships of individuals by obtaining their genetic information from a 
DTC provider would be fundamentally at odds with constitutional 
protections of those realms of privacy from government intrusion.373  
Although the benefits of solving violent cold cases through searches of DTC 
genetic databases would likely be significant, the countervailing privacy 
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interests of consumers are also considerable and should be accorded equal 
weight in the analysis.374 
Finally, permitting programmatic searches of DTC genetic databases 
circumvents both the meaningful limits that courts and legislatures have 
imposed on familial searches of CODIS and the prohibition of suspicionless 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.375  The breadth of DTC genetic 
databases will likely expand to encompass the genetic information of an even 
more sizeable percentage of the U.S. population as DTC genetic testing 
continues to grow in popularity.376  Case law on the scope of CODIS clearly 
establishes that there is a minimum permissible degree of individualized 
suspicion of offenders and arrestees that justifies the inclusion of seventeen 
million DNA profiles in CODIS.377  No such individualized suspicion 
inheres in a database of voluntarily disclosed genetic profiles from millions 
of ordinary citizens; thus, a search of such a database constitutes a 
suspicionless search.378  Although such searches may balance out the racial 
disparities inherent in CODIS, this is a highly indirect method of correcting 
the racial biases that permeate the criminal justice system, and thereby 
CODIS.379  Legislators and law enforcement should instead be encouraged 
to actively reform CODIS and the criminal justice system at large. 
Accordingly, an evaluation of genetic information pursuant to Carpenter’s 
framework overwhelmingly suggests that law enforcement should not have 
unfettered access to genetic information held by DTC providers as a result of 
the third-party doctrine.  Instead, private genetic information must be 
protected under the Fourth Amendment, and law enforcement should be 
required to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause that would narrow 
and focus a search of a DTC genetic database. 
C.  Preventing Indivisible Property Interests in Genetic Material 
Courts should not, however, evaluate the disclosure of genetic information 
to third-party DTC providers using the property-based approach articulated 
in the dissents to Carpenter.  Granting individuals an indivisible proprietary 
interest in their genome would have an extreme ripple effect on the field of 
biomedical research.380  Biomedical research using genetic material has 
measurable benefits to the public in developing new treatments for medical 
conditions.381  Funding for such research typically is incentivized by the 
potential to profit from patents on technology derived from such research.382  
A judicial determination that consumers have an indivisible proprietary 
interest in genetic information disclosed to a DTC provider could 
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inadvertently disrupt this system and, moreover, is not supported by most 
case law.383 
In addition, as Sonia Suter has powerfully argued, privacy considerations 
are a better tool to protect individual’s genetic information as opposed to 
proprietary considerations because privacy law is more attuned to the 
“dignitary harm and breach of trust” that can result from misuse of genetic 
information.384  Indeed, the risk in the disclosure of genetic information to 
law enforcement is, in large part, the “dignitary harm” caused by government 
intrusion into medical and familial privacy and not some sort of loss of a 
presumed proprietary interest in genetic information.  It is consequently 
better to determine whether law enforcement searches of DTC databases are 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment by reference to the Carpenter 
majority’s content-based analysis, which can take into account more abstract 
privacy interests that can be harmed through government intrusion and 
surveillance. 
CONCLUSION 
The benefits that result from using genetic databases to identify suspects 
in cold cases are concrete and tangible.  Through a single search, law 
enforcement officers might find a violent criminal or sexual predator who 
has eluded them for decades.  However, the intangible harms that result from 
government surveillance of intimate genetic information can have a 
significant impact on individuals’ sense of security from the government and 
warrant considerable protections under the Fourth Amendment. 
As third-party providers collect more and more information about 
consumers, perhaps legislatures will become more proactive about regulating 
such providers.  Yet, in the absence of such legislation, there are strong legal 
grounds to object to warrantless law enforcement searches of private genetic 
databases on the basis of Carpenter.  If the Court in Carpenter found that 
reasonable expectations of privacy foreclosed the warrantless disclosure of a 
comprehensive record of one’s movements to the government, it is difficult 
to rationalize that the same protections should not be afforded to genetic 
material that undoubtedly reveals a host of intimate and highly personal 
information pertaining to one’s identity, hereditary conditions, and familial 
relationships.  The oversight of government searches afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment and the warrant requirement can ensure that privacy interests in 
genetic information will only be compromised if absolutely necessary and 
that the search will be limited in scope.  Such limits on the third-party 
doctrine are undoubtedly necessary to preserve consumers’ personal liberties 
and prevent invasive surveillance by law enforcement in the twenty-first 
century. 
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